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Abstract
This article contributes to our understanding of transboundary environmental management regimes through the
application of an analytical framework that facilitates an exploration of the co-existence of conflict and cooperation.
Rather than framing conflict and cooperation as mutually exclusive states at opposite ends of a spectrum, we seek to
understand the ways in which cooperation can exist at the same time as conflict. We apply this framework to a study of
conservation management in a transboundary area at the intersection of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda
and Uganda. We identify two actual and one hypothetical phase of conflict–cooperation relations, in a landscape notor-
ious for some of the worst violence of the last two decades. We map the evolution of phases of transboundary protected
area management against the evolving security context, and we find that this approach has greater explanatory power
than previous approaches that polarize conflict and cooperation. In particular, it helps us to understand the drivers of
environmental cooperation, including the evolving characteristics of that cooperation. This new way of understanding
the relationship between environmental management and security also enables us to reconsider the potential for envi-
ronmental management to be instrumental in working towards interstate security objectives, for example through peace
parks. We don’t find that the ‘low politics’ of environmental management should be seen as a predictable and manage-
able determinant of international relations. But an understanding of the coexistence of conflict and cooperation does
also point to a more complex, non-linear relationship between low and high politics.
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Introduction
Transboundary regimes for managing parks and
natural resources grew in popularity during the 1980s
and 1990s, owing to their potential contribution to sus-
tainable development and peacebuilding. Many ecosys-
tem functions and services operate across political
borders with, for example, hydrological services often
requiring regional management regimes and carbon stor-
age requiring global strategy. Furthermore, political lead-
ers are increasingly aware of the multiple ways in which
these services support human well-being at a range of
scales (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Border
areas oftenmake particularly large contributions to human
welfare in this way, owing to the presence of, for example,
high biodiversity, forested hills and border rivers. And
yet, protecting such wealth through collaborative manage-
ment poses particular challenges in such areas, especially
where conflict exists within and between the neighbouring
states.
This article seeks to further our understanding of the
relationship between conflict and cooperation in trans-
boundary ecosystem management. It does this through
a study of protected areas in the Virunga Massif, the
southern part of the Greater Virunga landscape that
straddles the intersection of the borders of Uganda,
Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
One of the remarkable stories from this landscape is the
way in which cooperation over biodiversity conservation
has slowly but steadily evolved despite often intensely
violent conflicts. As such, this is also a location that most
clearly challenges forms of analysis that position cooper-
ation and conflict as mutually exclusive states of rela-
tions. We think the limitations of this way of thinking
are clear enough and, therefore, we adapt a framework
developed by Mirumachi & Allan (2007) that considers
the co-existence of conflict and cooperation. This frame-
work enables us to better understand the emergence of
cooperation and also provides insight into the linkage
between environment and security and thus between low
and high politics. Before detailing the development and
use of this framework, we briefly review the environment
and conflict literature with an emphasis on transbound-
ary issues, which leads into a summary of the ecological,
economic and political rationales for transboundary
management regimes. Following development of the
conceptual framework, we apply it to the case study,
using evidence gained from semi-structured interviews
with 38 key actors in protected area authorities and envi-
ronmental NGOs. Interviews took place during visits to
the three countries in 2008 and 2009.
Natural resources, conflict and cooperation
Natural resources play an important role in the dynamics
between individuals, communities and states because
of the social, economic and political values that flow
from ecosystem functions. This flow of values to human
society is commonly conceptualized as a set of ecosys-
tem services, underpinned by biodiversity, including
provisioning services (goods such as timber and non-
timber forest products), cultural services (including aes-
thetic benefits), regulatory services (including climate
and water regulation) and supporting services (such as
pollination and soil formation). These resources and
services often straddle international borders, and these
border regions often contain the most intact ecosystems
(Griffiths, 1995).
Some authors consider that competition for scarce
and threatened resources and services can lead to dis-
putes and even be the cause of armed conflict among and
within states (Klare, 2001; Renner, 2002). Normally the
causal relation is not considered to be direct, but
mediated by social variables such as poverty and inequal-
ity. Competition for resources, in the contexts of poverty
and perceived distributional injustice, can thus lead to
amplification of existing social fault-lines such as ethnic
difference (Kaplan, 1994; Baechler, 1999), a pathway that
is most likely where state and other institutions are dys-
functional (Homer-Dixon, 1999). Several authors propose
that the utilization, allocation and degradation of land and
water resources have been among the sources of conflicts
in, for example, the Jordan Valley, Sudan, Rwanda and
Mexico (Lowi, 1993; Suliman, 1999; Howard &
Homer-Dixon, 1995; Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1996).
On the other hand, such indirect causality is difficult
to evidence and this analytical approach has been criti-
cized for privileging local explanations (population and
resources) over more fundamental matters of distribu-
tion rooted in the global political economy (e.g. Peluso
& Watts, 2001).
Regardless of whether we assert contested environ-
mental resources as causes of conflict, transboundary for-
ests such as those in the Virunga Massif have often
become sites of conflict. This is because, firstly, conflicts
often take place between neighbouring countries (Furlong
&Gleditsch, 2003); secondly, the borders themselves may
be contested (Starr & Thomas, 2005); thirdly, they can
become sites of military conflict and sanctuaries for both
combatants and civilians, owing to their strategic locations
(Austin & Bruch, 2003; McNeely, 2003b); and fourthly,
valuable forest-based resources, including gold, coltan and
some timbers and charcoal, can provide the resources to
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sustain and escalate existing conflicts (Bannon & Collier,
2003).
Borders between hostile states can become zones of
conservation, such as that between North and South
Korea (Westing, 2010). But they can also become
degraded in the face of conflict and its aftermath because
of vacuums in authority, movements of armies and civi-
lians, and subsequent pressures for land for resettlement
(Rutagarama & Martin, 2006). Wars and conflicts can
have direct negative impacts on forests and biodiversity,
such as habitat destruction, erosion and pollution, as well
as more widely felt impacts through the reduction in reg-
ulatory ecosystem services such as moderation of river
flows (McNeely, 2003). While such environmental
change can undermine local well-being in the longer
term, there are often more immediate tragedies: in con-
temporary African warfare, most victims are resource-
dependent civilians (Ross, 2004).
Just as natural resources are sites of everyday and
extraordinary conflicts, so too are they sites of coopera-
tion. For example, shared water resources have beenmore
a driver for cooperation between states than a driver of
conflict (Wolf, 1998), and there is growing policy interest
in the role that environmental governance can play in
peacebuilding (UNESCO, 2003; DFID, 2007; UNEP,
2009). It is not so much that conflict and cooperation are
entirely separate pathways, but rather that competition
for scarce resources can spur institutional innovation
boosting social capital and adaptive capacity. Hence,
while Kaplan (1994) and others view competition for
resources as driving a vicious cycle of social dislocation,
others look to the possibility of a virtuous circle based
on better governance (Martin, 2005). There are already
a number of international water agreements signed
between riparian states, and associated collaborative
management institutions, such as the Nile Basin Initia-
tive. Equally, the number of land-based Transboundary
Conservation Areas (TBCAs) grew gradually in the sec-
ond half of the 20th century until around 1990, at which
point it began to increase more rapidly (van der Linde et
al., 2001) with 59 TBCAs in 1988 and 188 in 2005 (Ali,
2007), albeit that cooperation is often at relatively low
levels (Zbicz, 2003). We identify four broad sets of
reasons why governments and other actors have become
interested in Peace Parks and other forms of cooperation
over transboundary environmental management:
1. The ecological rationale
The ecological case for transboundary management of
biodiversity is based on the need for larger scales of man-
agement, requiring joining of parks but also extension of
conservation beyond park boundaries. This is often part
of a case for ‘landscape’ level management, which is
desirable where ecological structures at this scale can be
expected to significantly affect species abundance and
distribution (Fahrig, 2005; With, 2005). Many pro-
tected areas are not large enough to preserve biodiversity
in the long term, and we know that species can become
extinct even when they exist in protected areas (Wilkie,
Adams & Redford, 2008). Also, solitary parks are often
too small to maintain evolutionary and ecological pro-
cesses (Danby & Slocombe, 2005), although this is only
a particular transboundary issue where borders have
physical barriers to movement.
2. The economic rationale
Transboundary cooperation in both the water and
conservation fields is also justified in terms of a contribu-
tion to economic development. The argument goes that
transboundary cooperation brings about a ‘basket of
benefits’, including direct and indirect economic benefits
for the states involved and their communities (Sadoff &
Grey, 2005). In addition, it is argued that the benefits
accrued by states through cooperation are greater than
they could derive individually. In brief, it is expected that
institutionalized transboundary cooperation may con-
tribute to enhanced economic growth and development
and, eventually, economic integration and regionaliza-
tion (Ali, 2007). In the specific case of conservation, it
is expected that cooperation can generate direct eco-
nomic benefits – such as ecotourism revenue – but also
indirect benefits such as the economic growth of mar-
ginalized borderlands, poverty reduction and socio-
economic benefits for local communities ( Jones &
Chonguiça, 2001; Wolmer, 2003; Ali, 2007). Such inte-
gration of conservation and economic development
objectives is explicit in the Great Limpopo Transfrontier
Park (Bu¨scher & Dietz, 2005).
3. The political rationale
The transboundary cooperation goals can exceed the
environmental and economic realms and include what
Sadoff & Grey’s (2005) study of water resources refers
to as ‘benefits beyond the river’. In the conservation
field, there is the expectation that institutionalized
cross-border cooperation will enhance regionalization.
This is particularly the case in the Southern Africa region
where ideologically-laden concepts such as regional inte-
gration, democratization, the African renaissance, and
peacebuilding go hand in hand with the establishment
of transboundary protected areas (van Amerom &
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Bu¨scher, 2005). Other political benefits associated with
transboundary cooperation include its potential capacity
to mitigate the impacts of conflicts and to eventually
establish lines of communication between conflicting
partners (Shambaugh, Oglethorpe & Ham, 2001;
Thorsell, 1990).
4. The peacebuilding rationale
Since the mid-1980s, against a backlash of ‘resource
wars’ inspired by realist thinking, international organiza-
tions have begun to disseminate liberal-inspired concepts
such as ‘water for peace’ and ‘parks for peace’, with the
understanding that environmental cooperation could
have multiplying effects and be a catalyst for regional sta-
bility (UNESCO, 2003; UNEP, 2009). The underlying
contention is that the institutionalization of interna-
tional resource governance cooperation can lead to the
establishment or strengthening of international friend-
ship (Shine, 1997). Historical examples include the cre-
ation of Transboundary Protected Areas (TBPAs)
between Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1924 (Westing,
1993) and the United States and Canada in 1932
(MacDonald, 2000). TBPAs can reinforce harmonious
relations, contribute to conflict prevention and promote
confidence-building between neighbouring countries
(Westing, 1998), particularly in areas with relatively
recent histories of conflict (Hanks, 1998; Sandwith et
al., 2001; Hammill & Besançon, 2003; Ali, 2007). If
such claims prove well-founded, TBPAs might contrib-
ute to reducing conflict re-occurrence rates: 44% of
countries having a violent conflict are back at war within
5 years of a ceasefire (Bannon & Collier, 2003).
Not all scholars are persuaded by claims that TBPAs
have peacebuilding potential. For one thing there is a
lack of empirical evidence of peacebuilding outcomes,
and parks are likely to have relatively little independent
effect on international relations (McNeely, 2003b).
Furthermore, securitizing environmental issues such as
biodiversity conservation might help to push them onto
policy agendas – Kaplan’s (1994) piece was reportedly
read widely in US political and military circles – but this
may distract (e.g. donors) from the real human security
issues faced by the rural poor in developing countries
(Barnett, 2001). The packaging of environmental coop-
eration as a security initiative might also serve to obscure
real political economic agendas such as economic liberal-
ization, the commodification of parks and wildlife, or the
furthering of an individual country’s regional political
ambitions (Wolmer, 2003; van Amerom & Bu¨scher,
2005). In these and other ways, therefore, it is possible
that, rather than promoting peace, the establishment of
TBPAs could exacerbate old border conflicts between
states and/or create new ones, for example through
unequal distribution of new income streams among the
countries (van Amerom & Bu¨scher, 2005). The estab-
lishment of TBPAs might also exacerbate conflicts
between governments and local communities through,
for example, land grabs and evictions, loss of access to
resources, and (re-)centralization of control over both
resources and people (Brockington, Duffy & Igoe,
2008; Neumann, 2000; Brottem & Unruh, 2009;
Dzingirai, 2004).
Amid such uncertainties, what we can be sure of is
that transboundary forests have often been sites of con-
flict and increasingly in recent years have become sites
of cooperation. While there is a critique of the peace-
building potential of TBPAs, there remains hope that
they could develop into a force for good in regional pol-
itics by helping to internalize norms, establish regional
identities and interests, facilitate international communi-
cation and, ultimately, encourage more effective man-
agement of shared natural resources (Brock, 1991;
McNeely, 2003b). The rest of this article focuses on a lit-
tle understood feature of TBPAs, but one we believe is
critical to their potential to deliver benefits: the dynamic
coexistence of conflict and cooperation, and the implica-
tions for the forms of cooperation that emerge.
Conceptualizing the dynamic coexistence of
conflict and cooperation
It is not uncommon to see conflict and cooperation rep-
resented as opposite poles of a spectrum. For example,
the Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) scale
ranges from level 1, representing the most cooperative
events, through level 8 (neutral) to level 15, representing
the most conflictive events (Azar, 1993). Understanding
natural resource management dynamics as either conflict
or cooperation, or understanding them as opposing poles,
obscures the reality of the vast majority of contexts in
which cooperation and conflict actually coexist (Zeitoun
& Mirumachi, 2008). Examples of the coexistence of
cooperation and conflict (with different intensities) may
be identified, including:
 The existence of formal cooperation through agree-
ments and joint institutions notwithstanding the
existence of conflicts of interests among users (high
cooperation; low conflict), e.g. the Great Limpopo
Transfrontier Park.
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 Informal communication and consultation between
national protection authorities, supported by Mem-
orandums of Understanding (MoUs), but no formal
institutionalization as yet (low cooperation; low con-
flict), e.g. Niassa–Selous corridor (Mozambique–
Tanzania).
 Informal collaboration during times of civil or inter-
state war (low cooperation; high conflict), e.g. the
Virunga Massif during the 1990s.
Instead of conceptualizing conflict and cooperation one-
dimensionally, that is, on a continuum along a single
axis, Mirumachi & Allan (2007) find that greater under-
standing can be gained from a multi-dimensional
framing of the interaction between conflict and cooper-
ation. Their framework represents different intensities of
conflict and cooperation as axes on a two-dimensional
matrix, while also engaging with a third dimension, time.
We find this useful as a prompt for thinking about the
evolving state of transboundary relations. For our analy-
sis of conflict and cooperation in the Greater Virunga we
have adapted the scales of conflict and cooperation, cali-
brating them to the regional political and environmental
context. We proceed to explain how we developed these
scales.
Scales of conflict in a cross-border region
The Great Lakes region of Central Africa has been the
stage of several inter- and intrastate conflicts, often with
cross-border causes and spillover effects (Lemarchand,
2009; Prunier, 2008). Conflicts between and within
Rwanda, DR Congo and Uganda have been at the heart
of this violent history. The border parks of the Virunga
Massif, including the contiguous Volcanoes National
Park (Rwanda), Mgahinga Gorilla National Park
(Uganda) and Virunga National Park (DRC) have not
been the cause of the conflicts but have repeatedly been
sites of conflict.
For the purpose of our framework, we adapt a categor-
ization of conflict intensity levels identified by Azar
(1993), modified by Wolf, Yoffe & Giordano (2003)
and simplified by Zeitoun & Warner (2006) into three
very broad categories: ‘no significant conflict’, ‘cold con-
flict’ and ‘violent conflict’. We change the terminology,
opting for low, medium and high-level conflict, and
define them as follows:
High-level conflict: Generalized armed conflict
(a) between states or (b) within states, with major causes
and/or effects in the neighbouring countries. Examples
of (a) include the second Congo war, 1998–2003 (and
arguably beyond that) described by Prunier (2008)
and Turner (2007) as ‘Africa’s world war’, and the
1990–94 Rwandan war in which the Congo and Rwanda
governments were opposed to the Uganda government
and the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Examples of (b)
include the genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the Kivu wars
in DRC since 1996. In all cases, the causes and effects
have been transboundary. In our categorization, the Vir-
unga Massif was in and out of this highest-intensity trans-
boundary conflict from 1990 to 2003.
Medium-level conflict: Scattered armed or political
conflict (for example in pre-conflict and post-conflict
situations) including some transboundary causes and
effects. Examples include the severing of diplomatic rela-
tions, closing of borders, political spillover effects, and
those entailed by refugee movements. We categorize the
Virunga Massif in this way from 2003. While deadly vio-
lence has continued, especially in the North Kivu district
of DRC, and this conflict has a transboundary dimen-
sion, this is less intense than the preceding 1998–2003
Congo War.
Low-level conflict: Generalized peace between and
within neighbouring countries, although (potentially)
exhibiting signs of political volatility and/or low-
intensity localized conflicts. Since the independence
period, the region as a whole has not experienced a situ-
ation of comprehensive or relative peace. Uganda and
Rwanda are now experiencing a period of political stabi-
lity, but it is too early to call the outbreak of peace in
Eastern Congo and this conflict still has regional charac-
teristics stemming from wars in the 1990s.
No conflict: A situation of comprehensive peace and
political stability and security.
Scales of cooperation
The Virunga network of protected areas has also been an
arena for evolving transboundary cooperation over con-
servation despite enduring regional instability (van der
Linde et al., 2001; Lanjouw, 2003; Plumptre, 2003;Mar-
tin et al., 2011). In order to analyse the drivers behind and
the evolution and implications of transboundary cooper-
ation, we identify different levels of cooperation/coordi-
nation to populate the cooperation axis of our matrix.
To do so, we draw from three sources. First, the basic
framework for our scale is adapted from Zbicz (1999,
2003) who identifies six levels of co-operation ranging
from (1) no cooperation, going through stages of com-
munication, consultation, collaboration and coordina-
tion, to (6) full cooperation: fully integrated, ecosystem-
based planning. Second, we look at Metcalfe’s (1994)
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nine-point scale of policy coordination which similarly
takes us from complete independence of operation,
through communication and consultation, onwards
through joint working in committees and teams, to
joint planning through an integrated core executive.
Significantly, Metcalfe’s scale is only partly normative,
that is, it is generally desirable to advance to higher
levels of coordination, but not always appropriate or
desirable to seek the highest level of coordination.
We also note that these similar scales have been
applied to both cooperation and coordination. These
are not quite the same thing, and we opt for a limited
degree of separation on our scale to reflect the differ-
ence between formal (more coordinated) and informal
cooperation.
Informal cooperation: collective action at the field
level, involving local actors and/or national agencies, but
which is mainly informal and focuses on specific tasks
on the ground; without the existence of a formal agree-
ment signed by high-level political representatives.
Formal cooperation: involving high-level political
agreement (e.g. ministries, heads of state) between states,
providing an official endorsement to norms and an
institutional framework that guides cooperative ‘on the
ground’ activities.
(Sources: Singh, 1999; Zbicz, 1999; van der Linde et al.,
2001; Sandwith et al., 2001)
Bringing together these inputs, we arrive at the following
five different levels of cooperation:
1. No cooperation.
2. Low-level cooperation: Some communication
between authorities including bilateral talks and
short-term actions; limited consultation but part-
ners inform each other of some activities.
3. Informal medium-level cooperation intensity:
Consultation and collaboration between local as
well as national authorities to avoid overlap and con-
flicts, including frequent meetings and joint activi-
ties; but principally at the field and informal level,
with no formal agreement.
4. Formal medium-level cooperation intensity: Col-
laboration and coordination between local and
national authorities, including going beyond avoid-
ance of overlap and conflict, to actively seek conver-
gence of policy and priorities; joint coordination
planning with a certain degree of high-level political
support evidenced by MoUs. A formal joint
institution may be formed (an executive) but this
remains subservient to national planning.
5. High-level cooperation intensity: Full and institu-
tionalized transboundary cooperation, including a
formal agreement between states at the higher polit-
ical level and the establishment of a joint institution
with strong executive powers; includes a regional
approach including environmental, economic and
political benefits; at a minimum, considerable prog-
ress towards harmonization of norms and manage-
ment practices, and towards a unitary protected
area and authority.
Transboundary interaction in the Virunga
Massif
Border parks in the Virunga Massif have become arenas
for increasingly securitized and even violent conflicts
between states, while at the same time becoming arenas
for progressively intense cooperation over park manage-
ment. Figure 1 shows how conflict and cooperation have
coexisted in the Greater Virunga over recent decades,
combining different levels of intensity. Three different
periods are identified and analysed.
1. The 1990–94 period (high conflict, low or no
cooperation);
2. The 1995–2003 (high/medium conflict, informal
medium cooperation);
3. 2004–10 (medium/low conflict, formal medium
cooperation, with moves towards high levels of
cooperation).
Pre-1990: Paving the way for transboundary cooperation
Informal cooperation dates back to the 1970s, although
these early attempts to develop bilateral and trilateral
cooperation over parkmanagement failed to gain traction.
In 1973, for example, a tripartite meeting for Regional
Development of Tourism was held in Kigali to develop
a regional action plan, but was not followed up (d’Huart,
1989). In 1979 theMountain Gorilla Project (MGP) was
established, with a mandate to work in Rwanda only, but
with an objective that was clearly transboundary. It was
during the 1980s that recognition of the importance of
transboundary collaboration really began to take hold
and some large conservation NGOs such as Fauna &
Flora International and the African Wildlife Foundation
were closely involved with learning these lessons through
their involvement with the MGP. Cooperation during
the 1970s and 1980s remained at a low level because it
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included mainly communication and meetings between
partners, but no joint activities.
1990–94: Collaboration despite a generalized
regional context of conflict and insecurity (high
conflict, low cooperation)
The first half of the 1990s was characterized by
high-level intensity conflict in the region involving
Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC. During this period, the
three countries’ interstate political relations were very
tense and violent conflict centred on two factions: the
Hutu-dominated Rwandan government supported by
President Mobuto in DRC, and the Tutsi-based Rwanda
Patriotic Front (RPF) supported by Uganda. From the
1950s until 1990, around a million Rwandan Tutsis had
fled the country during successive waves of interethnic
violence. The RPF was formed in Uganda among some
of those exiled Tutsis who learned warfare fighting in the
National Resistance Army that displaced the anti-Tutsi
Milton Obote in Uganda and brought Yoweri Museveni
to power. Relations between Rwanda and Uganda were
such that the borders were closed throughout the
1990–94 Rwandan war.
During this period the transboundary park areas
themselves played a role in the conflict. For example, the
RPF’s second attempt to invade Rwanda, in January
1991, was launched through the Volcanoes National
Park. The parks would later become escape routes for
millions fleeing the violence. Set against this context of
generalized conflict and regional instability, it was
remarkable that conservation partners were able to bring
together the three Protected Area Authorities (PAAs) in
1991 and reach an agreement on a conservation pro-
gramme involving all three countries with an evolving
framework for regional collaboration. The International
Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) was founded
in 1991 as a partnership between the African Wildlife
Foundation (AWF), Fauna & Flora International (FFI)
and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). During
1991–94, IGCP’s transboundary activities were largely
confined to DRC and Rwanda, with bilateral ‘regional
meetings’ with representatives of the two PAAs and
cross-border visits by field personnel. From November
1993 until the genocide of April 1994, there was a brief
period of organizing joint patrols with teams of around
ten rangers spending about a week working and camping
Figure 1. Transboundary interaction in the Greater Virunga
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together. At that time, relations between Rwanda and
Uganda were too poor to engage in these patrols and mee-
tings. However, there was limited cooperation between
Congo and Uganda, for example to agree on a set of
actions when gorillas crossed the border from Bwindi
Impenetrable National Forest into the neighbouring Sar-
ambwe Forest Reserve in DRC.
While we classify this as ‘low’ level cooperation, this is
not intended to undermine either its importance or
indeed its appropriateness at that time. The IGCP coor-
dinator at that time described these patrols to us as
. . . really quite remarkable . . . . There was real brother-
hood in these events. I saw Congolese wearing Rwandan
shirts and vice versa – they exchanged shirts like football
players. (Personal communication)
The subsequent director of IGCP described the
regional meetings as:
a foundation for building trust and collegiality. Friend-
ships formed and wardens were able to deal with prob-
lems that otherwise might have involved the police . . .
the kind of thing that had previously escalated into
major incidents. Regional meetings had a deep impact.
(Personal communication)
This coexistence of cooperation with intense conflict
can partly be understood by the job-related affinity
between front-line PAA staff which afforded a basis for
building relationships and a collective identity. But it is
also critical to note that this was, in effect, styled as an
NGO–state model of transboundary cooperation. This
involved the NGO working to position itself as a neutral
facilitator, whose value was to provide opportunities for
structured face-to-face communication in which shared
goals were articulated and pursued.
1995–2003: Informal and field cooperation in the
Greater Virunga (medium/high conflict low/medium
(informal) cooperation)
This period of the region’s history is marked to a consid-
erable degree by the aftermath of the Rwandan war and
genocide, including the massive exodus of Hutu refugees
into Eastern DRC, their militarization of refugee camps
near the Rwandan border, the activities of Rwandan and
Ugandan troops within DRC and the outbreak of the
second Congo war in 1998. With Mobutu still in power,
Rwanda and DRC were bitter enemies following Paul
Kagame’s seizure of power in Rwanda. Mobutu’s over-
throw, hastened by Kagame’s military intervention,
brought Laurent Kabila to power in 1997 and temporarily
improved bilateral relations. However, many wounds
were re-opened with the advent of the second Congo
War, not only involving Rwanda but also Uganda, which
stationed troops within DRC borders until the 2003
peace agreement. This was a period of intense looting of
DRC mineral resources, facilitated by rebel and national
armies, both within and outside of protected areas
(Turner, 2007).
In spite of the region’s lingering conflicts, collaboration
between the three countries in the Greater Virunga made
considerable progress through informal and field-level
cooperation, including some concrete achievements that
have undoubtedly contributed to conservation effective-
ness, most notably an increase in the number of mountain
gorillas (Kalpers et al., 2003). In institutional terms, the
main achievement was the closer collaboration between
the three Protected Area Authorities. This involved
improved communication and information sharing
between PAA staff, including regional training pro-
grammes and the inception of regional meetings of staff
from headquarters and field offices of the 3 countries, and
meetings between PAAs and NGOs to initiate a process of
strategic planning. Ranger-based monitoring was devel-
oped and adopted as harmonized practice which contrib-
uted to information sharing (Gray & Kalpers, 2005), as
did the introduction of joint and then coordinated patrols,
collaborative gorillas censuses and anti-poaching activities.
Cooperation had taken place mainly at a low level and
through informal medium-level cooperation, and this
can be understood through reference to the background
of violent conflict. Transboundary collaboration oper-
ated under very heavy constraints that meant that formal
ministerial-level cooperation was not possible and the
‘NGO–state model’ was the most appropriate at the
time. The need to work at practitioner level, supported
by the facilitation skills of an NGO partnership, helps
to explain why efforts at this stage focused on building
a constituency of front-line collaborators:
We have been developing transboundary collaboration
for more than ten years and without politicians being
involved it did work. It was important for UWA, ICCN
and ORTPN to do this – it was important to them
despite all the wars. (Deputy director, ICCN, DRC,
personal communication)
2004–10: Towards formalization and
institutionalization of cooperation in the Greater Virunga
(medium conflict, medium cooperation [formal])
The political context of the region in the mid to
late 2000s has somehow improved, with greater political
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stability in Rwanda and Uganda. In 2003, the
governments of Uganda and the DRC signed the Luanda
Agreement that stipulated the withdrawal of Ugandan
troops from the DRC and the normalization of these
neighbouring states’ relations. However, the agreement
did not resolve the causes of conflict in the Kivu region
of eastern DRC, and sporadic fighting resumed in 2005,
including continuation of the overspill of Rwandan
Hutu–Tutsi violence on DRC soil. Relations between
Rwanda and DRC have been poor, though improving
in 2009 with joint military activity against the CNDP,
a Tutsi rebel group that was widely believed to be sup-
ported by Rwanda. During this period of relative stabi-
lity, Uganda and Rwanda have enjoyed strong backing
from the international donor community, good eco-
nomic performance and increased regional integration
through the East Africa Community (EAC).
The backdrop to this period, then, is one of relative
domestic security and prosperity in Rwanda and
Uganda, continued war in North Kivu, and often poor
political relationships between states. Despite these poor
relationships it became widely felt that the involvement
of governments in more formal transboundary conserva-
tion arrangements was a necessary and viable progres-
sion, albeit with certain risks. One of the key strengths
of informal cooperation was seen to be the capacity for
personal relationship-building:
It has been about confidence building through continu-
ous interaction. At times we thought that others were
bad, but this changes when you have met them a few
times. (Chief conservation warden, Bwindi-Mgahinga
Conservation Area, personal communication)
However, an approach to cooperation based on per-
sonal relationships also began to be seen as a weakness,
leading to arguments for more formal institutionalization:
Institutions are the key to TBNRM [transboundary nat-
ural resource management] . . . . They are more stable
than individuals who move away and more stable than
NGOs who depend on short-term funds. (IGCP pro-
gramme director, personal communication)
In the early 2000s, a process of NGO consultation
funded by the MacArthur Foundation led to A Frame-
work for Conservation in the Albertine Rift 2004–2030
which covered 6 planning units, including Unit 2, the
Greater Virunga landscape. Parallel to this effort at trans-
boundary management, a regional meeting was held in
2004 between the executive directors of the PAAs of the
three countries and IGCP, leading to a Memorandum of
Understanding for the Central Albertine Rift Protected Area
Network. The key elements of this MoU were: (a) to
agree to develop a Transfrontier Strategic Plan; (b) to
coordinate management of the parks; and (c) to establish
a transboundary secretariat. In 2005, this was strength-
ened by the Tripartite Declaration of Goma, signed by
the three state ministers in charge of natural resource
management. The declaration stressed that efforts would
be made to move towards formal agreement for trans-
boundary management and to lobby respective govern-
ments for financial commitment to implement the
strategic plan. In 2006, the Ten Year Transboundary
Strategic Plan was produced with support from IGCP
and funding from the Dutch Embassy. In the same year
a Trilateral MoU on the Collaborative Monitoring of
and Sharing Revenues from Transfrontier Tourism Gor-
illa Groups was signed. In terms of institutionalization,
in 2008 the Greater Virunga Transboundary Collabora-
tion Secretariat (GV-TCS) came into existence, and in
2009 a ministerial agreement granted it legal status, ren-
dering it independent from IGCP. These two events rep-
resent the beginning of the formal phase of TBNRM in
the region.
With the developments of the second half of the
2000s, cooperation in the Greater Virunga has moved
to a second phase (Figure 1), one of more formalized and
institutionalized cooperation, as MoUs have been signed
and the secretariat established. However, it is important
to highlight that Phase 2 does not describe a move away
from Phase 1 activities, but rather an additional set of
relations and partners that broadens the scope of colla-
boration. Typically, the integration of collaboration
through institutional levels begins at board level and
moves downwards (Kanter, 1994); but whichever direc-
tion it takes, relationship-building at multiple levels pro-
vides stronger bonding than that at single levels.
Phase 3 remains hypothetical although it is expected
by key partners in the Virunga area. It refers to progres-
sion from cooperation and coordination over separate,
contiguous parks, to the creation of an integrated Trans-
frontier Protected Area with a single name/brand, a uni-
tary management authority and harmonized rules and
management practices. This would require agreement
at presidential level. While this remains some way off,
it is viewed as realistic in the longer term.
The pressure for this idea is building progressively and
taking root. There has not yet been enough time to
push this all the way, and now is not the right time.
But the single fact that the strategic plan has been
endorsed by 3 countries is a victory. Nothing can stop
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eventual approaches to Kabila, Kagame and Museveni.
(Independent consultant, personal communication)
Some authors consider that formal agreements are
crucial for sustained transboundary cooperation, as they
secure commitment and accountability (Sandwith et al.,
2001; van der Linde et al., 2001) and establish the norms
and national obligations of the states within transbound-
ary contexts (Zbicz, 2003). On the other hand, protected
area management is a politicized process (Hammill &
Besancon, 2003) and formalization will only be an
appropriate strategy when the social and political context
is receptive to ministerial and presidential negotiation
and agreement. Major political constraints include prin-
ciples of national sovereignty, concerns for domestic
security, poor diplomatic relations and lack of political
will (van der Linde et al., 2001; van Amerom, 2002;
Hamill & Besancon, 2003). Clearly, there are risks to
forcing any move to Phase 3 before the time is right.
Discussion: Fostering cooperation amidst
conflict
While the Greater Virunga region continues to face sig-
nificant constraints to transboundary collaboration, we
now consider some of the opposing drivers: those factors
that have enabled progressive levels of cooperation. We
identify four main enabling factors: improved political
relations, third-party involvement, mutual benefit and
relationships. The first of these has been adequately cov-
ered, that is, the generally more stable relationships
between the three states and domestic stability in
Rwanda and Uganda. Equally, we have made reference
to the second factor, that is, the role of a partnership
of conservation NGOs operating under IGCP (AWF,
FFI, WWF). We should just add that there are several
other NGOs supporting a wider process of transbound-
ary collaboration in the Albertine Rift, including the
Wildlife Conservation Society (who are extending trans-
boundary cooperation across the Rwanda–Burundi bor-
der and further north along the Uganda–DRC border),
the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International and the
Albertine Rift Conservation Society, who coordinated
the process of formulating the 2004–030 framework.
Mutual benefit is considered one of the fundamental
conditions for successful partnership (Selsky & Parker,
2005). In transboundary park management, mutuality
arises partly from the spatial configuration of the material
landscape, including the ecosystem functions and the
services that flow from these. Park authorities are depen-
dent on each other in the long term for successful
conservation and for management of ecosystem services
and disservices. For example, species such as elephant
and mountain gorilla roam across borders. Actions in
one country can easily affect another, such as when secu-
rity measures in DRC disturbed elephant migration
routes in Mikeno sector, resulting in a rapid rise in
crop-raiding incidents in Rwanda (Gray & Kalpers,
2005). However, different groups of stakeholders hold
different priorities in terms of what they seek to gain
from cooperation. As discussed earlier, in addition to
ecological gains, there are also potential benefits to eco-
nomic development and to peacebuilding.
Managing benefits (and harms) is crucial and sensitive,
owing to the potential for creating feelings of inequity and
hostility (Lejano, 2006; Wolmer, 2003). We identify four
facts that have helped to build perceptions of mutual ben-
efit and avoid creation of new conflicts. First, communica-
tion has been central, from informal regional meetings in
the early 1990s to formal meetings in the late 2000s,
enabling agents to understand their mutual dependence
and to build trust and norms (such as reciprocity) needed
to act upon this. Second, economic rules of the game have
been configured to institutionalize mutuality both across
countries and, to some extent, across constituencies within
countries. Specifically, because of the roving nature of gor-
illas and their high value for tourism income, the 2006
MoU on sharing revenue from transfrontier gorilla groups
reduced the recriminations that previously resulted from
migration of groups across borders:
Due to the gorilla revenue sharing agreement, all sides
have an interest in gorilla safety. They used to be suspi-
cious when habituated groups crossed boundaries, for
example thinking that the Rwandans had used sugar
canes to entice the Nyakagezi group across from Uganda.
(IGCP programme officer, personal communication)
50% revenue sharing can create a lot of peace. (UWA
deputy director, personal communication)
Third, consistent rules and harmonized standards can
support faith in collective action. Revenue sharing is
itself an example of this. Another is the harmonized stan-
dards for managing gorilla tourism in terms of numbers
of visitors allowed per group, length of stay and so on.
Fourth, ownership of the process is important to percep-
tions of equity and mutual interest. The structure of the
current transboundary executive is such as to provide
equal ownership to each authority:
It does not make sense for a PAA director or minister
not to cooperate with the strategy – they would be
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killing their own baby. (Executive secretary, GVTCS,
personal communication)
There is no question about our commitment . . . it is
our own creation. (Executive director, UWA, personal
communication)
The enabling factors discussed above are predomi-
nantly institutional, relating to the structuring of eco-
nomic relations and organizations. Such institutions
help us to understand the emergence of cooperation
alongside conflict, but only tell part of the story. The
actions of different stakeholders cannot be fully under-
stood through rational self-interest based on distribution
of goods and bads, and it might be that transboundary
parks work precisely where such considerations are aug-
mented by positive personal relationships (Lejano, 2006;
Lejano & Ingram, 2009). Kanter (1994) identifies a con-
tinuum from low to high engagement between colla-
borators: (i) strategic integration in which only leaders
have relationships, (ii) tactical integration, in which
middle managers also engage, (iii) operational integration,
with day-to-day implementation staff collaborating,
(iv) interpersonal integration, with denser networks of
maturing personal ties, and (v) cultural integration, based
on willingness to change ways of working to fit with par-
tners. As has been stated, the NGO–state model of TBPA
management in theGreaterVirunga somewhat complicates
such a progression, by proceeding through (iii) followed
by (ii) and then (i), followed by (iv) and then, hypotheti-
cally, (v). In this case, the lack of formal agreement at the
outset has not proved an obstacle to the TBPA, and the
informal relationship-building among front-line staff
may even have been the key to subsequent formalization.
This is not unprecedented – in the Kgalagadi case, colla-
boration had taken place for 50 years before the presidents
of Botswana and SouthAfrica signed formal papers to create
the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (Sandwith et al., 2001;
Griffin et al., 1999).
We suggest that the creation of multiple-level rela-
tionships (perhaps regardless of starting level) over a long
duration is crucial to the sustainability of cooperation in
areas with recent experience of conflict. When partner-
ship is based entirely on rational choice – on mutual
expectations of future economic benefits (or even conser-
vation gains) – the past is not so important (Parsons,
2007). However, when relationships are developed over
long periods (recall shirt-swapping in the early 1990s)
the past clearly starts to count, because trust and friend-
ship are formed from experience. Relationships carry the
weight of historical engagement to bear on future expec-
tations through a kind of relational path dependence.
The institutional configurations mentioned above serve
to support and protect this social capital.
We capitalize on what we have – history – even when
there is fighting going on. (IGCP programme officer,
personal communication)
The long duration of our work leads to credit. We main-
tain a presence and we build credit and draw on this
when necessary. (WWF programme coordinator, per-
sonal communication)
Relationship-building has helped form the trust nec-
essary to pursue institutional reforms that foster condi-
tions of equity and coordination that support strong
partnership. Indeed, we tentatively observe something
of a virtuous circle between institutions and relations.
On the one hand, relationship-building has built the
trust necessary to pursue institutional reforms that sup-
port strong partnership. On the other hand, these acts
of institutionalization provide displays of trust and
mutuality while also providing conditions such as
accountability that help to sustain relationships.
Conclusions
Our analysis of the transboundary conservation efforts in
the Greater Virunga has shown that conflict and cooper-
ation have not been mutually exclusive. Rather, they
have coexisted, even when violent conflict has dominated
the region. While in some respects this is remarkable, in
other respects it might be seen as normal. It is the frame-
works that we have hitherto chosen to represent conflict
and cooperation that have defined one in terms of the
absence of the other. Such one-dimensional frameworks
serve well enough when we are only interested in a single
type of conflict/cooperation, such as the diplomatic rela-
tions between states. But when we are also interested in
additional relational dimensions, such as environmental
management, they prove inadequate.
This inadequacy reveals itself when we consider envi-
ronmental management in relation to a typology of
‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. Miriam Lowi (1995) argues that
the antagonists of ‘high politics’ tend not to collaborate
over the ‘low politics’ issues of economy and environ-
ment. She suggests that they would have to be ‘induced’
to cooperate over natural resource management (p. 9),
either due to heavy strategic dependence on the resource
in question, or the presence of a hegemonic power whose
interest was served by cooperation (as induced Sudan to
cooperate with Egypt over river Nile waters, for exam-
ple). Contrary to this finding, however, we observe that
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antagonists can and do cooperate over technical matters
of managing material concerns and that in our case at
least, they have done this in the absence of either of
Lowi’s conditions. The relatively straightforward lesson
we learn from this is that management strategies matter:
that the planned institutional landscape, including the
channels of communication, the rules of the game and
participation in governance appear to contribute to
enabling low politics to proceed even in the absence of
resolution to high politics.
But is there a bigger lesson? Can we assert a causal link
between the simultaneous practice of low and high pol-
itics, such that the former is instrumental in transform-
ing the latter? Our case study provides an observation
of developing environmental cooperation that is at least
in part synchronized with developing peace. However,
it does not provide evidence of any causal link, nor does
it propose a theory of change that would accompany
such evidence. For example, one of the recent mile-
stones in the advancement of peace was the 2009 deci-
sion for Rwanda and DRC to undertake joint military
action against the CNDP. As we have no evidence to
the contrary, we have to assume that this decision fell
in the traditional realm of high politics and was not
strongly influenced either by the improved relation-
ships generated through low politics, or by the environ-
ment itself becoming shifted into the arena of high
politics because of its contribution to a broadly con-
ceived human security.
This article does not therefore conclude a determinis-
tic relationship between environmental cooperation and
the security policies of states. The two are clearly related
to each other in our case, but the nexus of their trajec-
tories is not based on simple, unilinear causality but on
a more complex constitution of management spaces, fea-
turing a dialectic between institutions and relationships.
Getting the environmental management institutions
right will not itself transform these spaces of politics in
ways that can resolve the tragic violence familiar to this
region. But it would also be a mistake to think that envi-
ronmental politics operates in complete isolation from
security decisions. For one thing, those who make secu-
rity decisions spend much of their time dealing with and
worrying about everyday low politics, and security deci-
sions are likely to be framed by these dual responsibilities
(Barnett, 1990). Following that line of reasoning, secu-
rity decisions cannot be entirely isolated from environ-
mental concerns. One should not so much think of
whether environment can or should cross a line from
low to high politics but rather how we understand the
blurring of this divide, in terms of more complex
relationships between conflict and cooperation and
between high and low politics.
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